me of this end. It is
happiness. What all men seek, what is the motive of all their actions,
that which they desire for the sake of itself and nothing beyond, is
happiness. But though all agree as to the name, beyond that there is
no agreement. Philosophers, {315} no less than the vulgar, differ as
to what this word happiness means. Some say it is a life of pleasure.
Others say it consists in the renunciation of pleasures. Some
recommend one life, some another.

We must repeat here the warning which was found necessary in the case
of Plato, who also called the _summum bonum_ happiness. Aristotle's
doctrine is no more to be confused with modern utilitarianism than is
Plato's. Moral activity is usually accompanied by a subjective feeling
of enjoyment. In modern times the word happiness connotes the feeling
of enjoyment. But for the Greeks it was the moral activity which the
word signified. For Aristotle an action is not good because it yields
enjoyment. On the contrary, it yields enjoyment because it is good.
The utilitarian doctrine is that the enjoyment is the ground of the
moral value. But, for Aristotle, the enjoyment is the consequence of
the moral value. Hence when he tells us that the highest good is
happiness, he is giving us no information regarding its nature, but
merely applying a new name to it. We have still to enquire what the
nature of the good is. As he himself says, everyone agrees upon the
name, but the real question is what this name connotes.

Aristotle's solution of this problem follows from the general
principles of his philosophy. We have seen that, throughout nature,
every being has its proper end, and the attainment of this end is its
special function. Hence the good for each being must be the adequate
performance of its special function. The good for man will not consist
in the pleasure of the senses. Sensation is the special function of
animals, but not of man. Man's special function is reason. Hence the
proper {316} activity of reason is the _summum bonum_, the good for
man. Morality consists in the life of reason. But what precisely that
means we have still to see.

Man is not only a reasoning animal. As the higher being, he contains
within himself the faculties of the lower beings also. Like plants he
is appetitive, like animals, sensitive. The passions and appetites are
an organic part of his nature. Hence virtue will be of two kinds. The
highest virtues will be found in the life of reaso