ble the object, because we cannot compare our idea
with the object itself. To do so would involve getting outside our own
minds. We know nothing of the object except our idea of it, and
therefore we cannot compare the original and the copy, since we can
see only the copy.

Later Scepticism.

After a period of obliteration, Scepticism again revived in the
Academy. Of this last phase of Greek scepticism, Aenesidemus, a
contemporary of Cicero, is the earliest example, and later we have the
well-known names of Simplicius and Sextus Empiricus. The distinctive
character of later scepticism is its return to the position of Pyrrho.
The New Academy, in its eagerness to overthrow the Stoic dogmatism,
had fallen into a dogmatism of its own. If the Stoics dogmatically
asserted, the Academics equally dogmatically denied. But wisdom lies
neither in assertion nor denial, but in doubt. Hence the later
Sceptics returned to the attitude of complete suspense of judgment.
Moreover, the Academics had allowed the possibility of probable
knowledge. And even this is now regarded as dogmatism. Aenesidemus was
the author of the ten well-known arguments to show the impossibility
of knowledge. They contain in reality, not ten, but only two or three
distinct ideas, several being merely different expressions of the same
line of reasoning. They are as follows. (1) The feelings and
perceptions of all living beings differ. (2) Men have physical and
mental differences, which make things appear different to them. (3)
The different senses give different {367} impressions of things. (4)
Our perceptions depend on our physical and intellectual conditions at
the time of perception. (5) Things appear different in different
positions, and at different distances. (6) Perception is never direct,
but always through a medium. For example, we see things through the
air. (7) Things appear different according to variations in their
quantity, colour, motion, and temperature. (8) A thing impresses us
differently when it is familiar and when it is unfamiliar. (9) All
supposed knowledge is predication. All predicates give us only the
relation of things to other things or to ourselves; they never tell us
what the thing in itself is. (10) The opinions and customs of men are
different in different countries.

{368}

CHAPTER XVIII

TRANSITION TO NEO-PLATONISM

It has been doubted whether Neo-Platonism ought to be included in
Greek philosophy at all, and Erdma