o
the family and to the individual in order of thought, and in reality.
For the State is the end, and the end is always prior to that of which
it is the end. The state as form is prior to the family as matter, and
in the same way the family is prior to the individual. And as the
explanation of things is only possible by teleology, it is the end
which explains the beginning, it is the State which explains the
family, and not vice versa.

The true nature of the State, therefore, is not that it is a
mechanical sum of individuals, as a heap of sand is the sum of its
grains. The State is a real organism, and the connexion of part to
part is not mechanical, but organic. The State has a life of its own.
And its members also have their own lives, which are included in the
higher life of the State. All the parts of an organism are themselves
organisms. And as the distinction between organic and inorganic is
that the former has its end in itself, while the latter has its end
external to it, this means that the State is an end in itself, that
the individual is an end in himself, and that the former end includes
the latter. Or we may express the same thought otherwise by saying
that, in the State, both the whole and the parts are to be regarded as
real, both having their own lives and, in their character as ends,
their own rights. Consequently, there are two kinds of views of the
nature of the State, which are, according to Aristotle, fundamentally
erroneous. The first is the kind of view which depends upon asserting
the reality of the parts, but denying the reality of the whole, or,
what is the same {323} thing, allowing that the individual is an end
in himself, but denying that the State as a whole is such an end or
has a separate life of its own. The second kind of false view is of
the opposite kind, and consists in allowing reality only to the whole
State, and denying the reality of its parts, the individuals. The
opinions that the State is merely a mechanical aggregate of
individuals, that it is formed by the combination of individuals or
families for the sake of mutual protection and benefit, and that it
exists only for these purposes, are examples of the first kind. Such
views subordinate the State to the individual. The State is treated as
an external contrivance for securing the life, the property, or the
convenience of the individual. The State exists solely for the sake of
the individual, and is not in itself an end. Th