n, for the Stoics, the same thing. For the
universe is governed not only by law, but by the law of reason, and
man in following his own rational nature is _ipso facto_ conforming
himself to the laws of the larger world. In a sense, of course, there
is no possibility of man's disobeying the laws of nature, for he, like
all else in the world, acts of necessity. And it might be asked, what
is the use of exhorting a man to obey the laws of the universe, when,
as part of the great mechanism of the world, he cannot by any
possibility do anything else? It is not to be supposed that a genuine
solution of this difficulty is to be found in Stoic philosophy. They
urged, however, that, though man will in any case do as the necessity
of the world compels him, it is given to him alone, not merely to obey
the law, but to assent to his own obedience, to follow the law
consciously and deliberately, as only a rational being can.

Virtue, then, is the life according to reason. Morality is simply
rational action. It is the universal reason which is to govern our
lives, not the caprice and self-will {350} of the individual. The wise
man consciously subordinates his life to the life of the whole
universe, and recognises himself as merely a cog in the great machine.
Now the definition of morality as the life according to reason is not
a principle peculiar to the Stoics. Both Plato and Aristotle taught
the same. In fact, as we have already seen, to found morality upon
reason, and not upon the particular foibles, feelings, or intuitions,
of the individual self, is the basis of every genuine ethic. But what
was peculiar to the Stoics was the narrow and one-sided interpretation
which they gave to this principle. Aristotle had taught that the
essential nature of man is reason, and that morality consists in
following this, his essential nature. But he recognized that the
passions and appetites have their place in the human organism. He did
not demand their suppression, but merely their control by reason. But
the Stoics looked upon the passions as essentially irrational, and
demanded their complete extirpation. They envisaged life as a battle
against the passions, in which the latter had to be completely
annihilated. Hence their ethical views end in a rigorous and
unbalanced asceticism.

Aristotle, in his broad and moderate way, though he believed virtue
alone to possess intrinsic value, yet allowed to external goods and
circumstances a place in t