ging it to be everywhere
infected with self-contradiction. His arguments seem almost purely
verbal, but this is no place for arguing that point out. [Cf. F. H.
Bradley; _Appearance and Reality, passim;_ and below, pp. 106-122.]

[35] Of which all that need be said in this essay is that it also can be
conceived as functional, and defined in terms of transitions, or of the
possibility of such. [Cf. _Principles of Psychology_, vol. I, pp.
473-480, vol. II, pp. 337-340; _Pragmatism_, p. 265; _Some Problems of
Philosophy_, pp. 63-74; _Meaning of Truth_, pp. 246-247, etc. ED.]

[36] [Cf. below, pp. 93 ff.]

[37] [Cf. "How Two Minds Can Know One Thing," below, pp. 123-136.]

[38] The notion that our objects are inside of our respective heads is
not seriously defensible, so I pass it by.

[39] [The argument is resumed below, pp. 101 sq. ED.]

[40] Our minds and these ejective realities would still have space (or
pseudo-space, as I believe Professor Strong calls the medium of
interaction between 'things-in-themselves') in common. These would exist
_where_, and begin to act _where_, we locate the molecules, etc., and
_where_ we perceive the sensible phenomena explained thereby. [Cf.
Morton Prince: _The Nature of Mind, and Human Automatism_, part I, ch.
III, IV; C. A. Strong: _Why the Mind Has a Body_, ch. XII.]

[41] [Cf. below, p. 188; _A Pluralistic Universe_, Lect. IV-VII.]

[42] I have said something of this latter alliance in an article
entitled 'Humanism and Truth,' in _Mind_, October, 1904. [Reprinted in
_The Meaning of Truth_, pp. 51-101. Cf. also "Humanism and Truth Once
More," below, pp. 244-265.]

III

THE THING AND ITS RELATIONS[43]

Experience in its immediacy seems perfectly fluent. The active sense of
living which we all enjoy, before reflection shatters our instinctive
world for us, is self-luminous and suggests no paradoxes. Its
difficulties are disappointments and uncertainties. They are not
intellectual contradictions.

When the reflective intellect gets at work, however, it discovers
incomprehensibilities in the flowing process. Distinguishing its
elements and parts, it gives them separate names, and what it thus
disjoins it can not easily put together. Pyrrhonism accepts the
irrationality and revels in its dialectic elaboration. Other
philosophies try, some by ignoring, some by resisting, and some by
turning the dialectic procedure against itself, negating its first
negations, to restor