s such,
see [the first essay], 'Does Consciousness Exist?'). There are, in fact,
three distinguishable 'activities' in the field of discussion: the
elementary activity involved in the mere _that_ of experience, in the
fact that _something_ is going on, and the farther specification of this
_something_ into two _whats_, an activity felt as 'ours,' and an
activity ascribed to objects. Stout, as I apprehend him, identifies
'our' activity with that of the total experience-process, and when I
circumscribe it as a part thereof, accuses me of treating it as a sort
of external appendage to itself (Stout: _op. cit._, vol. I, pp.
162-163), as if I 'separated the activity from the process which is
active.' But all the processes in question are active, and their
activity is inseparable from their being. My book raised only the
question of _which_ activity deserved the name of 'ours.' So far as we
are 'persons,' and contrasted and opposed to an 'environment,' movements
in our body figure as our activities; and I am unable to find any other
activities that are ours in this strictly personal sense. There is a
wider sense in which the whole 'choir of heaven and furniture of the
earth,' and their activities, are ours, for they are our 'objects.' But
'we' are here only another name for the total process of experience,
another name for all that is, in fact; and I was dealing with the
personal and individualized self exclusively in the passages with which
Professor Stout finds fault.
The individualized self, which I believe to be the only thing properly
called self, is a part of the content of the world experienced. The
world experienced (otherwise called the 'field of consciousness')
comes at all times with our body as its centre, centre of vision,
centre of action, centre of interest. Where the body is is 'here';
when the body acts is 'now'; what the body touches is 'this'; all
other things are 'there' and 'then' and 'that.' These words of
emphasized position imply a systematization of things with reference
to a focus of action and interest which lies in the body; and the
systematization is now so instinctive (was it ever not so?) that no
developed or active experience exists for us at all except in that
ordered form. So far as 'thoughts' and 'feelings' can be active, their
activity terminates in the activity of the body, and only through
first arousing its activities can they begin to change those of the
rest of the world. [Cf. also _
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