sed that its
signification is not discoverable, or, upon the other hand, if it can be
pinned down to any definite statement, then that statement will be
false."[87] Mr. Ward in turn says of Mr. Bradley: "I cannot even imagine
the state of mind to which his description applies.... [It] reads like
an unintentional travesty of Herbartian psychology by one who has tried
to improve upon it without being at the pains to master it."[88]
Muensterberg excludes a view opposed to his own by saying that with any
one who holds it a _Verstaendigung_ with him is "_grundsaetzlich
ausgeschlossen_"; and Royce, in a review of Stout,[89] hauls him over
the coals at great length for defending 'efficacy' in a way which I, for
one, never gathered from reading him, and which I have heard Stout
himself say was quite foreign to the intention of his text.
In these discussions distinct questions are habitually jumbled and
different points of view are talked of _durcheinander_.
(1) There is a psychological question: "Have we perceptions of activity?
and if so, what are they like, and when and where do we have them?"
(2) There is a metaphysical question: "Is there a _fact_ of activity?
and if so, what idea must we frame of it? What is it like? and what
does it do, if it does anything?" And finally there is a logical
question:
(3) "Whence do we _know_ activity? By our own feelings of it solely? or
by some other source of information?" Throughout page after page of the
literature one knows not which of these questions is before one; and
mere description of the surface-show of experience is proferred as if it
implicitly answered every one of them. No one of the disputants,
moreover, tries to show what pragmatic consequences his own view would
carry, or what assignable particular differences in any one's experience
it would make if his adversary's were triumphant.
It seems to me that if radical empiricism be good for anything, it
ought, with its pragmatic method and its principle of pure experience,
to be able to avoid such tangles, or at least to simplify them somewhat.
The pragmatic method starts from the postulate that there is no
difference of truth that doesn't make a difference of fact somewhere;
and it seeks to determine the meaning of all differences of opinion by
making the discussion hinge as soon as possible upon some practical or
particular issue. The principle of pure experience is also a methodical
postulate. Nothing shall be adm
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