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Lastly, propositions sometimes assert _resemblance_ between two phenomena. It is not true that, as some contend, every proposition whose predicate is a general name affirms resemblance to the other members of the class; for such propositions generally assert only the possession by the subject of certain common peculiarities; and the assertion would be true though there were no members of the class besides those denoted by the subject. Nevertheless, _resemblance alone_ is _sometimes_ predicated. Thus, when individuals are put into a class as belonging to it, not absolutely, but rather than to any other, the assertion is, not that they have the attributes connoted, but that they resemble those having them more than they do other objects. So, again, _only resemblance_ is predicated, when, though the predicate is a class name, the class is based on general unanalysable resemblance. The classes in question are those of the simple feelings; the names of feelings being, like all concrete general names, connotative, but only of a mere resemblance. In short, one of _five_ things, viz. Existence, Coexistence (or, to be more particular, Order in Place), Sequence (or, more particularly, Order in Time, which comprises also the _mere fact of Coexistence_), Causation, and Resemblance, is asserted or denied in every proposition. This division is an exhaustive classification with respect to all things that can be believed. Although only propositions with concrete terms have been spoken of, it is equally the fact that, in propositions with an abstract term or terms, we predicate one of these same _five_ things. There cannot be any difference in the import of these two classes of propositions, since there is none in the import of their terms, for the real signification of a concrete term resides in its connotation (so that in a concrete proposition we really predicate an attribute), and what the concrete term connotes forms the whole sense of the abstract. Thus, all propositions with abstract terms can be turned into equivalent ones with concrete, the new terms being either the names which connote the attributes, or names of the facts which are the _fundamenta_ of the attributes: e.g. Thoughtlessness is danger, is equivalent to, Thoughtless actions (the _fundamentum_) are dangerous. Finally, as these _five_ are the only things affirmable, so are they the only things deniable. CHAPTER VI. PROPOSITIONS MERELY VERBAL. The
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