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the laws of my nature_) could unmake it; but _I_ (i.e. _my will_) cannot. In the Free-Will controversy, 'I' is used ambiguously for volitions, actions, and mental dispositions, and 'Necessity' both for _Certainty_ and for _Compulsion_. From the application of 'same,' 'one,' 'identical,' which primarily refer to a single object, to several objects because _similar_, grew up (for the purpose of accounting for the supposed _oneness_ in things said to have the _same_ nature or qualities) both the Platonic _Ideas_, and also the _Substantial Forms_ and _Second Substances_ of the Aristotelians, even though the latter did see the distinction between things differing both _specie_ and _numero_, and those differing _numero_ only. And thence, too, sprang Berkeley's proof of the existence of a Universal Mind from the supposed need of such a Being to harbour, in the interval, the idea, which, one and the same (really, only two _similar_ ideas), a man's mind has entertained at two distinct times. The difficulty in _Achilles and the Tortoise_ arises from the use of _infinity_, or, _for ever_, in the premisses, to signify a finite time which is infinitely divisible, and, in the conclusion, to signify an infinite time. Thus, again, 'right' is used to express, both what others have no right to stop a man from doing, and also what it is not against his own duty to do; both what people are entitled to expect from, and also what they may enforce from others. The Fallacy of Composition and Division, i.e. the use of the same term in a syllogism, at one time in a collective, at another in a distributive sense, is one of the Fallacies of Ambiguous Terms. Examples of it are the arguments, that _great men_ (collectively) could be dispensed with, because the place of any particular great man might have been supplied (i.e., in fact, by some other great man); and, that a high prize in a lottery may be reasonably expected (by _a certain individual_, viz. oneself), because a high prize is commonly gained (_by some one or other_). 2. In Petitio Principii, the premisses are not even verbally sufficient for the conclusion, since one premiss is either clearly the same as the conclusion, or actually proved from it, or not susceptible of any other proof. Men commonly fall into it, through believing that the premiss _was_ verified, though they have forgotten how. But the variety, termed Reasoning in a Circle, implies a conscious attempt to prove two propos
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