ertions of an enemy, who specifies no offence and offers no sort
of evidence. It was but natural that such charges should be made by
an astonished and disappointed foe--natural that the conqueror should
ascribe to any but the right cause the reluctance of a people to submit
to a monstrous usurpation, and their anxiety to avail themselves, by
the presence of a favorite leader, of a principle and prospects to which
their affections were really surrendered. Could the British commanders
in America have really been brought to admit that the affections of the
people were not with their sovereign, the war must have found a finish
much sooner than it did. Their hopes were built upon this doubt; and
hence their anxiety to show the coercive measures of the chieftains
by whom this control, adverse to their wishes, was maintained over the
minds of the people. The great influence of Marion was due to other
acts. It was by the power of love, and not of terror, that he managed
his followers. They loved him for himself, and loved his cause for their
country. His rare command of temper, his bland, affectionate manner, his
calm superiority, and that confidence in his courage and conduct, as a
leader, without which militia-men are never led to victory,--these were
the sources of his influence over them, and of their successes against
the enemy. It was through these that he "carried terror to the very
gates of Charleston." We shall see indeed, that, under Marion, the
militia were never conducted to defeat.

*1* Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 174.

*2* Moultrie, vol. 2, p. 236.

*3* MS. Memoirs of General Horry.

*4* James' Memoir, p. 122.--

Whatever may have been the causes of his victories, first over the minds
of his people, and next over their foes, the British found it necessary
that his influence should be restrained, and his farther progress
arrested. Cornwallis, as we have seen, was willing to "give a good deal
to have him taken." Tarleton is affectionately invoked to this pleasant
duty, by the sincere hope that he would "get at Mr. Marion." This,
however desirable, was no easy matter. Marion was a very "will o' the
wisp" in military affairs, almost as difficult to find, at times, by his
own followers, as by the enemy. He was the true model of a partisan in a
country, like ours, of swamp and thicket; leading the pursuing foe, like
Puck, "through bog and through briar," till he wearied out his patience,
exhausted his r