ritime School--that is, our own
traditional School, which too many writers both at home and abroad quietly
assume to have no existence. The evil tendency of that assumption cannot be
too strongly emphasised, and the main purpose of this and the following
chapters will be to show how and why even the greatest of the continental
strategists fell short of realising fully the characteristic conception of
the British tradition.

By the classification in question Clausewitz distinguished wars into those
with a "Limited" object and those whose object was "Unlimited." Such a
classification was entirely characteristic of him, for it rested not alone
upon the material nature of the object, but on certain moral considerations
to which he was the first to attach their real value in war. Other writers
such as Jomini had attempted to classify wars by the special purpose for
which they were fought, but Clausewitz's long course of study convinced him
that such a distinction was unphilosophical and bore no just relation to
any tenable theory of war. Whether, that is, a war was positive or negative
mattered much, but its special purpose, whether, for instance, according to
Jomini's system, it was a war "to assert rights" or "to assist an ally" or
"to acquire territory," mattered not at all.

Whatever the object, the vital and paramount question was the intensity
with which the spirit of the nation was absorbed in its attainment. The
real point to determine in approaching any war plan was what did the object
mean to the two belligerents, what sacrifices would they make for it, what
risks were they prepared to run? It was thus he stated his view. "The
smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller presumably
will be the means of resistance he will employ, and the smaller his means,
the smaller will ours be required to be. Similarly the smaller our
political object, the less value shall we set upon it and the more easily
we shall be induced to abandon it." Thus the political object of the war,
its original motive, will not only determine for both belligerents
reciprocally the aim of the force they use, but it will also be the
standard of the intensity of the efforts they will make. So he concludes
there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy from a war of
extermination down to the use of an army of observation. So also in the
naval sphere there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy
or hostiliti