imited
war, as we shall see, this need not be the case, and if without making
these sacrifices we are able to act mainly on the defensive our position
becomes exceedingly strong.
The proposition really admits of no doubt. For even if we be not in
whole-hearted agreement with Clausewitz's doctrine of the strength of
defence, still we may at least accept Moltke's modification of it. He held
that the strongest form of war--that is, the form which economically makes
for the highest development of strength in a given force--is strategic
offensive combined with tactical defensive. Now these are in effect the
conditions which limited war should give--that is, if the theatre and
method be rightly chosen. Let it be remembered that the use of this form of
war presupposes that we are able by superior readiness or mobility or by
being more conveniently situated to establish ourselves in the territorial
object before our opponent can gather strength to prevent us. This done, we
have the initiative, and the enemy being unable by hypothesis to attack us
at home, must conform to our opening by endeavouring to turn us out. We are
in a position to meet his attack on ground of our own choice and to avail
ourselves of such opportunities of counter-attack as his distant and
therefore exhausting offensive movements are likely to offer. Assuming, as
in our own case we always must assume, that the territorial object is
sea-girt and our enemy is not able to command the sea, such opportunities
are certain to present themselves, and even if they are not used will
greatly embarrass the main attack--as was abundantly shown in the Russian
nervousness during their advance into the Liaotung Peninsula, due to the
fear of a counter-stroke from the Gulf of Pe-chi-li.
The actual situation which this method of procedure sets up is that our
major strategy is offensive--that is, our main movement is positive, having
for its aim the occupation of the territorial object. The minor strategy
that follows should be in its general lines defensive, designed, so soon as
the enemy sets about dislodging us, to develop the utmost energy of
counter-attack which our force and opportunities justify.
Now if we consider that by universal agreement it is no longer possible in
the present conditions of land warfare to draw a line between tactics and
minor strategy, we have in our favour for all practical purposes the
identical position which Moltke regarded as constitutin
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