icate interactions of the
land and sea factors produce conditions too intricate for such blunt
solutions. Even the initial equations they present are too complex to be
reduced by the simple application of rough-and-ready maxims. Their right
handling depends upon the broadest and most fundamental principles of war,
and it is as a standpoint from which to get a clear and unobstructed view
of the factors in their true relations that a theory of war has perhaps its
highest value.

The theory which now holds the field is that war in a fundamental sense is
a continuation of policy by other means. The process by which the
continental strategists arrived at it involved some hard philosophical
reasoning. Practical and experienced veterans as they were, their method is
not one that works easily with our own habit of thought. It will be well,
therefore, to endeavour first to present their conclusions in a concrete
form, which will make the pith of the matter intelligible at once. Take,
now, the ordinary case of a naval or military Staff being asked to prepare
a war plan against a certain State and to advise what means it will
require. To any one who has considered such matters it is obvious the reply
must be another question--What will the war be about? Without a definite
answer or alternative answers to that question a Staff can scarcely do more
than engage in making such forces as the country can afford as efficient as
possible. Before they take any sure step further they must know many
things. They must know whether they are expected to take something from the
enemy, or to prevent his taking something either from us or from some other
State. If from some other State, the measures to be taken will depend on
its geographical situation and on its relative strength by land and sea.
Even when the object is clear it will be necessary to know how much value
the enemy attaches to it. Is it one for which he will be likely to fight to
the death, or one which he will abandon in the face of comparatively slight
resistance? If the former, we cannot hope to succeed without entirely
overthrowing his powers of resistance. If the latter, it will suffice, as
it often has sufficed, to aim at something less costly and hazardous and
better within our means. All these are questions which lie in the lap of
Ministers charged with the foreign policy of the country, and before the
Staff can proceed with a war plan they must be answered by Ministers.

In