te number and of all degrees of distinction. So
complex indeed is the graduation presented that at first sight it appears
scarcely possible to make it the basis of practical study. But on further
examination it will be seen that by applying the usual analytical method
the whole subject is susceptible of much simplification. We must in short
attempt to reach some system of classification; that is, we must see if it
is not possible to group the variations into some well-founded categories.
With a subject so complex and intangible the grouping must of course be to
some extent arbitrary, and in some places the lines of demarcation will be
shadowy; but if classification has been found possible and helpful in
Zoology or Botany, with the infinite and minute individual variations with
which they have to deal, it should be no less possible and helpful in the
study of war.

The political theory of war will at any rate give us two broad and
well-marked classifications. The first is simple and well known, depending
on whether the political object of the war is positive or negative. If it
be positive--that is, if our aim is to wrest something from the enemy--then
our war in its main lines will be offensive. If, on the other hand, our aim
be negative, and we simply seek to prevent the enemy wresting some
advantage to our detriment, then the war in its general direction will be
defensive.

It is only as a broad conception that this classification has value. Though
it fixes the general trend of our operations, it will not in itself affect
their character. For a maritime Power at least it is obvious that this must
be so. For in any circumstances it is impossible for such a Power either to
establish its defence or develop fully its offence without securing a
working control of the sea by aggressive action against the enemy's fleets.
Furthermore, we have always found that however strictly our aim may be
defensive, the most effective means of securing it has been by
counter-attack over-sea, either to support an ally directly or to deprive
our enemy of his colonial possessions. Neither category, then, excludes the
use of offensive operations nor the idea of overthrowing our enemy so far
as is necessary to gain our end. In neither case does the conception lead
us eventually to any other objective than the enemy's armed forces, and
particularly his naval forces. The only real difference is this--that if
our object be positive our general plan