tal, and much less, probably, from such
a partial rejection as we have proposed.

I have now gone through my reasonings on this momentous subject, and have
stated the facts and deductions from them, which you will verify for
yourselves. Personal interest was not my object, or I should have pursued
a different line of conduct. Though I conceived that a man who owes
allegiance to the state is bound, on all important occasions, to propose
such inquiries as tend to promote the publick good; yet I did not imagine
it to be any part of my duty to present myself to the fury of those who
appear to have other ends in view. For this cause, and for this only, I
have chosen a feigned signature. At present all the reports concerning the
writer of these papers are merely conjectural. I should have been ashamed
of my system if it had needed such feeble support as the character of
individuals. It stands on the firm ground of the experience of mankind. I
cannot conclude this long disquisition better than with a caution derived
from the words of inspiration--_Discern the things of your peace now in the
days thereof, before they be hidden from your eyes_.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, XI.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 398)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 8, 1788.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

My last address contained the outlines of a system fully adequate to all
the useful purposes of the union. Its object is to raise a sufficient
revenue from the foreign trade, and the sale of our publick lands, to
satisfy all the publick exigencies, and to encourage, at the same time,
our internal industry and manufactures. It also secures each state in its
own separate rights, while the continental concerns are thrown into the
general department. The only deficiencies that I have been able to
discover in the plan, and in the view of federalists they are very great
ones, are, that it does not allow the interference of Congress in the
domestick concerns of the state, and that it does not render our national
councils so liable to foreign influence. The first of these articles tends
to guard us from that infinite multiplication of officers which the report
of the Convention of Philadelphia proposes. With regard to the second, it
is evidently not of much importance to any foreign nation to purchase, at
a very high price, a majority of votes in an assembly, whose members are
continually exposed to a recall. But give those members a right t