nopolies which have been universally injurious to all the subjects of
the countries that have adopted them, excepting the monopolists
themselves. They have also the unlimited right to imposts and all kinds of
taxes, as well to levy as to collect them. They have indeed very nearly
the same powers claimed formerly by the British parliament. Can we have so
soon forgot our glorious struggle with that power, as to think a moment of
surrendering it now? It makes no difference in principle whether the
national assembly was elected for seven years or for six. In both cases we
should vote to great disadvantage, and therefore ought never to agree to
such an article. Let us make provision for the payment of the interest of
our part of the debt, and we shall be fairly acquitted. Let the fund be an
impost on our foreign trade, and we shall encourage our manufactures. But
if we surrender the unlimited right to regulate trade, and levy taxes,
imposts will oppress our foreign trade for the benefit of other states,
while excises and taxes will discourage our internal industry. The right
to regulate trade, without any limitations, will, as certainly as it is
granted, transfer the trade of this state to Pennsylvania. That will be
the seat of business and of wealth, while the extremes of the empire will,
like Ireland and Scotland, be drained to fatten an overgrown capital.
Under our present equal advantages, the citizens of this state come in for
their full share of commercial profits. Surrender the rights of taxation
and commercial regulation, and the landed states at the southward will all
be interested in draining our resources; for whatever can be got by impost
on our trade and excises on our manufactures, will be considered as so
much saved to a state inhabited by planters. All savings of this sort
ought surely to be made in favour of our own state; and we ought never to
surrender the unlimited powers of revenue and trade to uncommercial
people. If we do, the glory of the state from that moment departs, never
to return.

The safety of our constitutional rights consists in having the business of
governments lodged in different departments, and in having each part well
defined. By this means each branch is kept within the constitutional
limits. Never was a fairer line of distinction than what may be easily
drawn between the continental and state governments. The latter provide
for all cases, whether civil or criminal, that can happen asho