rmed to the Divine will, because
it wills what God wishes him to will.

There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal
cause, consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God
wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal
conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is the proper
object of charity.

Reply Obj. 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For we
know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.
Consequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a
will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing
willed. But we know not what God wills in particular: and in this
respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.

But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he
wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that
particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in
all things not only formally, but also materially.

Reply Obj. 2: God does not will the damnation of a man, considered
precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as
death, because, "He wills all men to be saved" (1 Tim. 2:4); but He
wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to
such things it suffices for man to will the upholding of God's
justice and of the natural order.

Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.

To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said
that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of
the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who
conforms his will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed;
because the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on
account of the end.

To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act
are taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the
object considered materially.

To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills
when several people desire different things, but not under the same
aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same
aspect, one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is
no question of this here.
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QUESTION 20

OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTIONS
(In Six Articles)

We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions:
under which head there are