allied left wing to the coast and block
the road to Calais. It reached West Flanders on Oct. 13, and on Oct.
16 it came in contact with the German Army that approached from
Antwerp. The latter joined the German right wing north of Lille and
extended it to Westende. On the 18th, after having brought up all
their reserves, the Germans began their onslaught to break through in
the region of Dixmude and Ypres.

While, by Oct. 27, no appreciable impression had been made on the
allied battleline, the situation in the eastern seat of war had begun
to assume an alarming aspect, and necessitated the complete change in
the German plan of strategy, which marks the beginning of the second
phase of the war.

On the western front this second phase meant for the Germans the going
into the defensive along the entire battleline, which the allied
armies have been relentlessly attempting to break. In spite of their
continuous heroic efforts only minor successes, such as that of the
British at Neuve Chapelle and that of the French to the north of
Arras, have been achieved. Counter attacks, forming the most essential
element of the modern defensive, have been launched by the Germans
incessantly, and have on several occasions resulted in successes
similar to those of the Allies, as, for instance, at Soissons and at
Ypres. On the whole, no changes of strategic importance have taken
place, and the German wall in France stands firm to this day.

II.

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN

While, in the early days of August, the bulk of the German Army was
moving westward, not more than ten army corps were available for the
campaign against Russia. To them and to the Austrian armies fell the
task of laying the basis for the offensive contemplated for a later
date. The plan of campaign was to draw the Russians into the Polish
bag and tie it up. It was based on the knowledge that Russia's
principal strategic aim must, under all circumstances, be Cracow, the
gateway to Vienna and Berlin.

The enemy was to be allowed to reach it through Poland, while the
Germans should hold on to East Prussia and the Austrians to Galicia,
to flank the Russian advance from the north and south in preparation
for a campaign against the Russian lines of communication. This scheme
of bagging the enemy has governed all strategic moves of the campaign
against Russia to this day.

But the Muscovites were on their guard. They paid little attention to
the few German divisions that