st illustrated by
the message sent to his commander-in-chief by General Foch, commanding
the French Army of the Centre when he received the order to
counter-attack: "My left has been forced back, my right is routed. I
shall attack with the centre." When the counter-attack came it found
but rear guards opposing it. The retreat of the Germans, their right
flank constantly in danger of being rolled up, was a fine military
achievement. On Sept. 12 it halted on the Aisne. In the regions
northeast of Verdun the German left wing joined hands with the Sixth
German Army, which had followed up the retirement of the French Army
of Lorraine to the line Verdun-St. Die.

Thus resting on Metz with its left wing the German battle-front was
strongly established on a line passing Verdun, to the east and
northeast, extending from there in a general westerly direction to the
valley of the Aisne as far as the region north of Compiegne, and from
that point northward to the region west of Peronne and Cambrai.

The stability of this line, enabling a constant shifting of forces
toward the right wing, and the arrival there of the army released from
Maubeuge, made possible the extension of the battle-front to the
region of Arras, and frustrated all flanking movements on the part of
the Allies.

The situation was again safe, but the plan to put the French army hors
de combat was far from having been realized. The German General Staff
therefore decided on a new plan. Its purpose was to gain control of
the northeast coast of France. A wedge should be driven between the
two allied countries, and Pas-de-Calais made the base of further
operations against both. The following out of this plan constitutes
the fourth and last period of the first phase of the western
campaign. It starts with the beginning of the siege of Antwerp on
Sept. 28 and ends with the first battle of Ypres on Oct. 27.

The first step toward the accomplishment of the new aims was the
capture of Antwerp. Antwerp in the hands of the Allies meant a
constant menace to the German line of communication; in possession of
the Germans it signified the key to Northern France. The fortress was
taken on Oct. 9. The next point of strategic importance for the
pursuance of the German plan was Lille, which was taken on Oct. 12.

But the change in the German plan of strategy had been recognized by
the Allies, and a new English army from Havre was hurried to the line
Bethune-Dunkirk to extend the