f Charleston Merchants.--The Secession
Leaders only prepared to resist Coercion.--The Mob proves
unmanageable.--General Scott's Letter to the President, October
29.--The Situation in November.--No Instructions from
Washington.--Colonel Gardner's Report to General Wool.

The summer of 1860 found me stationed at the head-quarters of the First
United States Artillery at Fort Moultrie, South Carolina. I was captain
of Company E, and second in command to Brevet Colonel John L. Gardner,
who was lieutenant-colonel of the regiment. The regimental band and
Captain Truman Seymour's company (H) also formed part of the garrison.
The other forts were unoccupied, except by the ordnance-sergeants in
charge.

Charleston, at this period, was far from being a pleasant place for a
loyal man. Almost every public assemblage was tinctured with treasonable
sentiments, and toasts against the flag were always warmly applauded. As
early as July there was much talk of secession, accompanied with
constant drilling, and threats of taking the forts as soon as a
separation should occur.

To the South Carolinians Fort Moultrie was almost a sacred spot,
endeared by many precious historical associations; for the ancestors of
most of the principal families had fought there in the Revolutionary War
behind their hastily improvised ramparts of palmetto logs, and had
gained a glorious victory over the British fleet in its first attempt to
enter the harbor and capture the city.

The modern fort had been built nearly on the site of the ancient one.
Its walls were but twelve feet high. They were old, weak, and so full of
cracks that it was quite common to see soldiers climb to the top by
means of the support these crevices afforded to their hands and feet.
The constant action of the sea-breeze had drifted one immense heap of
sand against the shore-front of the work, and another in the immediate
vicinity. These sand-hills dominated the parapet, and made the fort
untenable. Indeed, it was originally built by the engineers as a mere
sea-battery, with just sufficient strength to prevent it from being
taken by a _coup de main_. As an overpowering force of militia could
always be summoned for its defense, it was supposed that no foreign army
would ever attempt to besiege it. The contingency that the people of
Charleston themselves might attack a fort intended for their own
protection had never been anticipated.

Our force was pitifully sma