Magazine_, has it that a council of war was held by us to determine
whether we would fire or not, and that we decided not to fire. He founds
this upon verbal statements made by Foster and Davis. I know Foster was
under this impression; but upon my recalling the circumstances to his
recollection a short time before his death, he admitted his mistake. My
memory is very clear and distinct on this point, and I am sustained in
regard to it by both Seymour and Crawford. Davis I have not seen for
some time, but I have no doubt he will confirm what I have said when his
memory is refreshed.

Indeed there was no time for deliberation while the troops were at the
guns, for the vessel was moving very rapidly, and the whole affair was
over in a few minutes. The council was held after the steamer had gone,
to determine what action ought to be taken in consequence of the
attack. It was too late then for resistance, and all we could do was to
send Lieutenant Hall to the governor with a flag of truce, to demand an
explanation. In this communication, Anderson expressly stated that if he
did not receive a satisfactory reply, he would not, hereafter, allow any
vessel from Charleston to pass within reach of his guns. As might be
expected, the governor replied that he took the responsibility of the
firing, and would do it again under like circumstances. Anderson then
reconvened the council to lay this answer before them. Through his
influence it was concluded to send Lieutenant Talbot to Washington with
a full statement of the occurrence, and await his return with specific
instructions from the War Department. To carry out even this programme,
the major was obliged to obtain the governor's permission for Lieutenant
Talbot to pass through Charleston. It was urged by Anderson that the
delay would enable us to finish our preparations for defense; but it was
evident that time was far more valuable to the enemy than it was to us,
for it enabled them to complete and arm their batteries, and close the
harbor against our men-of-war, thus virtually imprisoning us in our
island home.

When Talbot left, we resumed our labors as usual. No attempt was made
to carry out the threat of stopping all passing vessels.

By the 14th of January our heavy guns were up; but by that time, too,
the greater part of Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney were shielded from
our direct fire by huge piles of sand-bags.[13]

We now began to get out of fuel, but we still ha