fraid of losing its hold
upon the Hudson river, and Washington accordingly selected West Point as
the strongest position upon the river, to be fortified and defended at
all hazards. He sent Heath, with 3000 men, to hold the Highland passes,
and went up himself to inspect the situation and give directions about
the new fortifications. He left 7000 of his main body at Northcastle, in
charge of Lee, who had just returned from South Carolina. He sent 5000,
under Putnam, across the river to Hackensack; and ordered Greene, who
had some 5000 men at Forts Washington and Lee, to prepare to evacuate
both those strongholds and join his forces to Putnam's.

If these orders had been carried out, Howe's movement against Fort
Washington would have accomplished but little, for on reaching that
place, he would have found nothing but empty works, as at Brooklyn. The
American right wing would have been drawn together at Hackensack, and
the whole army could have been concentrated on either bank of the great
river, as the occasion might seem to require. If Howe should aim at the
Highlands, it could be kept close to the river and cover all the passes.
If, on the other hand, Howe should threaten the Congress at
Philadelphia, the whole army could be collected in New Jersey to hold
him in check.

[Sidenote: Howe takes Fort Washington, Nov. 16, 1776.]

But Washington's orders were not obeyed. Congress was so uneasy that it
sent word to Greene to hold both his forts as long as he could.
Accordingly he strengthened the garrison at Fort Washington, just in
time for Howe to overwhelm and capture it, on the 16th of November,
after an obstinate resistance. In killed and wounded the British loss
was three times as great as that of the garrison, but the Americans were
in no condition to afford the loss of 8000 men taken prisoners. It was a
terrible blow. On the 19th Greene barely succeeded in escaping from Fort
Lee, with his remaining 2000 men, but without his cannon and stores.

[Sidenote: Treachery of Charles Lee.]

Bad as the situation was, however, it did not become really alarming
until it was complicated with the misconduct of General Lee. Washington
had returned from West Point on the 14th, too late to prevent the
catastrophe; but after all it was only necessary for Lee's wing of the
army to cross the river, and there would be a solid force of 14,000 men
on the Jersey side, able to confront the enemy on something like equal
terms, fo