ad lately been sent by Washington to be of such
assistance as he could to Schuyler. Arnold stood high in the confidence
of both these generals. He had shown himself one of the ablest officers
in the American army, he was especially skilful in getting good work out
of raw troops, and he was a great favourite with his men. On hearing of
the danger of Fort Stanwix, Schuyler sent him to the rescue, with 1200
men. When he was within twenty miles of that stronghold, he contrived,
with the aid of some friendly Oneidas and a Tory captive whose life he
spared for the purpose, to send on before him exaggerated reports of the
size of his army. The device accomplished far more than he could have
expected. The obstinate resistance at Oriskany had discouraged the
Tories and angered the Indians. Distrust and dissension were already
rife in St. Leger's camp, when such reports came in as to lead many to
believe that Burgoyne had been totally defeated, and that the whole of
Schuyler's army, or a great part of it, was coming up the Mohawk. This
news led to riot and panic among the troops, and on August 22 St. Leger
took to flight and made his way as best he could to his ships at Oswego,
with scarcely the shred of an army left. This catastrophe showed how
sadly mistaken the British had been in their reliance upon Tory help.

The battle of Bennington was fought on the 16th of August. Now by the
overthrow of St. Leger, six days later, Burgoyne's situation had become
very alarming. It was just in the midst of these events that Gates
arrived, on August 19, and took command of the army at Stillwater, which
was fast growing in numbers. Militia were flocking in, Arnold's force
was returning, and Daniel Morgan was at hand with 500 Virginian
sharpshooters. Unless Burgoyne could win a battle against overwhelming
odds, there was only one thing that could save him; and that was the
arrival of Howe's army at Albany, according to the ministry's programme.
But Burgoyne had not yet heard a word from Howe; and Howe never came.

[Sidenote: Why Howe failed to cooeperate with Burgoyne.]

This failure of Howe to cooeperate with Burgoyne was no doubt the most
fatal military blunder made by the British in the whole course of the
war. The failure was of course unintentional on Howe's part. He meant to
extend sufficient support to Burgoyne, but the trouble was that he
attempted too much. He had another plan in his mind at the same time,
and between the two he