as Mr. Spencer
has pointed out, our only conception of that which we know as Mind in
ourselves is the conception of a series of states of consciousness. But,
he continues, 'Put a series of states of consciousness as cause and the
evolving universe as effect, and then endeavour to see the last as
flowing from the first. I find it possible to imagine in some dim way a
series of states of consciousness serving as antecedent to any one of
the movements I see going on; for my own states of consciousness are
often indirectly the antecedents to such movements. But how if I attempt
to think of such a series as antecedent to _all_ actions throughout the
universe ...? If to account for this infinitude of physical changes
everywhere going on, "Mind must be conceived as there," "under the guise
of simple-dynamics," then the reply is, that, to be so conceived, Mind
must be divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; and
that, when thus divested of its distinguishing attributes the conception
disappears--the word Mind stands for a blank.'

Moreover, 'How is the "originating Mind" to be thought of as having
states produced by things objective to it, as discriminating among these
states, and classing them as like and unlike; and as preferring one
objective result to another?'[25]

Hence, without continuing this line of argument, which it would not be
difficult to trace through every constituent branch of human psychology,
we may take it as unquestionable that, if there is a Divine Mind, it
must differ so essentially from the human mind, that it becomes
illogical to designate the two by the same name: the attributes of
eternity and ubiquity are in themselves enough to place such a Mind in a
category _sui generis_, wholly different from anything which the analogy
furnished by our own mind enables us even dimly to conceive. And this,
of course, is no more than theologians admit. God's thoughts are above
our thoughts, and a God who would be comprehensible to our intelligence
would be no God at all, they say. Which may be true enough, only we must
remember that in whatever measure we are thus precluded from
understanding the Divine Mind, in that measure are we precluded from
founding any conclusions as to its nature upon analogies furnished by
the human mind. The theory ceases to be anthropomorphic: it ceases to be
even 'anthropopsychic': it is affiliated with the conception of mind
only in virtue of the one fact that it serve