very
persistent, and very powerful, they do not appear to serve any 'end' or
'purpose' in the scheme of things, unless we accept the theory which is
given of them by those in whom they are most strongly developed. Here I
think we have an argument of legitimate force, although it does not
appear that such was the opinion entertained of it by Mill. I think the
argument is of legitimate force, because if the religious instincts of
the human race point to no reality as their object, they are out of
analogy with all other instinctive endowments. Elsewhere in the animal
kingdom we never meet with such a thing as an instinct pointing
aimlessly, and therefore the fact of man being, as it is said, 'a
religious animal'--i.e. presenting a class of feelings of a peculiar
nature directed to particular ends, and most akin to, if not identical
with, true instinct--is so far, in my opinion, a legitimate argument in
favour of the reality of some object towards which the religious side of
this animal's nature is directed. And I do not think that this argument
is invalidated by such facts as that widely different intellectual
conceptions touching the character of this object are entertained by
different races of mankind; that the force of the religious instincts
differs greatly in different individuals even of the same race; that
these instincts admit of being greatly modified by education; that they
would probably fail to be developed in any individual without at least
so much education as is required to furnish the needful intellectual
conceptions on which they are founded; or that we may not improbably
trace their origin, as Mr. Spencer traces it, to a primitive mode of
interpreting dreams. For even in view of all these considerations the
fact remains that these instincts _exist_, and therefore, like all other
instincts, may be supposed to have a _definite_ meaning, even though,
like all other instincts, they may be supposed to have had a _natural
cause_, which both in the individual and in the race requires, as in the
natural development of all other instincts, the natural conditions for
its occurrence to be supplied. In a word, if animal instincts generally,
like organic structures or inorganic systems, are held to betoken
purpose, the religious nature of man would stand out as an anomaly in
the general scheme of things if it alone were purposeless. Hence we have
here what seems to me a valid inference, so far as it goes, to the
effe