her will is desire in action,
so to speak, and desire but incipient will--are questions with which we
need not trouble ourselves. For it is certain that there are agnostics
who would greatly prefer being theists, and theists who would give all
they possess to be Christians, if they could thus secure promotion by
purchase--i.e. by one single act of will. But yet the desire is not
strong enough to sustain the will in perpetual action, so as to make the
continual sacrifices which Christianity entails. Perhaps the hardest of
these sacrifices to an intelligent man is that of his own intellect. At
least I am certain that this is so in my own case. I have been so long
accustomed to constitute my reason my sole judge of truth, that even
while reason itself tells me it is not unreasonable to expect that the
heart and the will should be required to join with reason in seeking God
(for religion is for the _whole_ man), I am too jealous of my reason to
exercise my will in the direction of my most heart-felt desires. For
assuredly the strongest desire of my nature is to find that that nature
is not deceived in its highest aspirations. Yet I cannot bring myself so
much as to make a venture in the direction of faith. For instance,
regarded from one point of view it seems reasonable enough that
Christianity should have enjoined the _doing_ of the doctrine as a
necessary condition to ascertaining (i.e. 'believing') its truth. But
from another, and my more habitual point of view, it seems almost an
affront to reason to make any such 'fool's experiment'--just as to some
scientific men it seems absurd and childish to expect them to
investigate the 'superstitious' follies of modern spiritualism. Even the
simplest act of will in regard to religion--that of prayer--has not been
performed by me for at least a quarter of a century, simply because it
has seemed so impossible to pray, as it were, hypothetically, that much
as I have always desired to be able to pray, I cannot will the attempt.
To justify myself for what my better judgement has often seen to be
essentially irrational, I have ever made sundry excuses. The chief of
them has run thus. Even supposing Christianity true, and even supposing
that after having so far sacrificed my reason to my desire as to have
satisfied the supposed conditions to obtaining 'grace,' or direct
illumination from God,--even then would not my reason turn round and
revenge herself upon me? For surely even then my
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