icism, as distinguished from what is
commonly so called.

FOOTNOTES:

[34] The first edition, which was published in 1878, was rapidly
exhausted, but, as my object in publishing was solely that of soliciting
criticism for my own benefit, I arranged with the publishers not to
issue any further edition. The work has therefore been out of print for
many years.

[This 'arrangement' was however not actually made, or at least was
unknown to the present publishing firm of Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner &
Co. Thus a new edition of the book was published in 1892, to the
author's surprise.--ED.]

[35] [Or rather it was intended that it should appear under the
pseudonym of 'Metaphysicus.'--ED.]

[36] [Words in square brackets have been added by me. But I have not
introduced the brackets when I have simply inserted single unimportant
words obviously necessary for the sense.--ED.]

[37] [See p. 29, quotation from Preface of 'Physicus.' The state of mind
expressed in the above Note is a return to the earlier frame of mind of
the Burney Essay, e.g. p. 20. That essay was full of the thought that
Christian evidences are very manifold and largely
'extra-scientific.'--ED.]

Sec. 2. DEFINITION OF TERMS AND PURPOSE OF THIS TREATISE.

[To understand George Romanes' mind close attention must be paid to the
following section. Also to the fact, not explicitly noticed by him, that
he uses the word 'reason' (see p. 112) in a sense closely resembling
that in which Mr. Kidd has recently used it in his _Social Evolution_.
He uses it, that is, in a restricted sense as equivalent to _the process
of scientific ratiocination_. His main position is therefore this:
Scientific ratiocination cannot find adequate grounds for belief in God.
But the pure agnostic must recognize that God may have revealed Himself
by other means than that of scientific ratiocination. As religion is for
the whole man, so all human faculties may be required to seek after God
and find Him--emotions and experiences of an extra-'rational' kind. The
'pure agnostic' must be prepared to welcome evidence of all
sorts.--ED.]

It is desirable to be clear at the outset as to the meaning which I
shall throughout attach to certain terms and phrases.

_Theism._

It will frequently be said, 'on the theory of Theism,' 'supposing Theism
true,' &c. By such phrase my meaning will always be equivalent
to--'supposing, for the sake of argument, that the nearest approach
which t