such as Hume and Mill, have
failed to perceive even so much as the intellectual necessity of looking
beyond our empirical knowledge of the fact to gain any explanation of
the fact itself. Therefore they give to the world the wholly vacuous, or
merely tautological theory of causation--viz. that of constancy of
sequence within human observation[51].

If it be said of my argument touching causality, that it is naturalizing
or materializing the super-natural or spiritual (as most orthodox
persons will feel), my reply is that deeper thought will show it to be
at least as susceptible of the opposite view--viz. that it is subsuming
the natural into the super-natural, or spiritualizing the material: and
a pure agnostic, least of all, should have anything to say as against
either of these alternative points of view. Or we may state the matter
thus: in as far as pure reason can have anything to say in the matter,
she ought to incline towards the view of my doctrine spiritualizing the
material, because it is pretty certain that we could know nothing about
natural causation--even so much as its existence--but for our own
volitions.

_Free Will_[52].

Having read all that is said to be worth reading on the Free Will
controversy, it appears to me that the main issues and their logical
conclusions admit of being summed up in a very few words, thus:--

1. A writer, before he undertakes to deal with this subject at all,
should be conscious of fully perceiving the fundamental distinction
between responsibility as merely legal and as also moral; otherwise he
cannot but miss the very essence of the question in debate. No one
questions the patent fact of responsibility as legal; the only question
is touching responsibility as moral. Yet the principal bulk of
literature on Free Will and Necessity arises from disputants on both
sides failing to perceive this basal distinction. Even such able writers
as Spencer, Huxley and Clifford are in this position.

2. The root question is as to whether the will is caused or un-caused.
For however much this root-question may be obscured by its own abundant
foliage, the latter can have no existence but that which it derives
from the former.

3. Consequently, if libertarians grant causality as appertaining to the
will, however much they may beat about the bush, they are surrendering
their position all along the line, unless they fall back upon the more
ultimate question as to the nature of natura