rtue, by repeated trial, had unequivocally distinguished from the
rest; and they limited their authority so far, as neither to leave them
the power of inflicting imprisonment or stripes, nor of exercising any
penal jurisdiction. But as punishment was necessary in a state of civil
society, "it was permitted to the priests alone, that it might appear to
have been inflicted, by the order of the gods, and not by any superiour
authority in man."

The accounts which we have thus given of the ancient Germans and Gauls,
will be found also to be equally true of those people, which had arrived
at the same state of subordinate society. We might appeal, for a
testimony of this, to the history of the Goths; to the history of the
Franks and Saxons; to, the history, in short, of all those nations, from
which the different governments, now conspicuous in Europe, have
undeniably sprung. And we might appeal, as a farther proof, to the
Americans, who are represented by many of the moderns, from their own
ocular testimony, as observing the same customs at the present day.

It remains only to observe, that as these customs prevailed among the
different nations described, in their early state of subordinate
society, and as they were moreover the customs of their respective
ancestors, it appears that they must have been handed down, both by
tradition and use, from the first introduction of _government_.

* * * * *

CHAP. III.

We may now deduce those general maxims concerning _subordination_,
and _liberty_, which we mentioned to have been essentially
connected with the subject, and which some, from speculation only, and
without any allusion to facts, have been bold enough to deny.

It appears first, that _liberty_ is a _natural_, and
_government_ an _adventitious_ right, because all men were
originally free.

It appears secondly, that government is a [042]_contract_ because,
in these primeval subordinate societies, we have seen it voluntarily
conferred on the one hand, and accepted on the other. We have seen it
subject to various restrictions. We have seen its articles, which could
then only be written by tradition and use, as perfect and binding as
those, which are now committed to letters. We have seen it, in short,
partaking of the _federal_ nature, as much as it could in a state,
which wanted the means of recording its transactions.

It appear thirdly, that the grand object of the _contras