ence, which did not create a variety of natures
without a purpose or design.

But if these things are so, how evidently against reason, nature, and
every thing human and divine, must they act, who not only force men into
_slavery_, against their own _consent_; but treat them altogether
as _brutes_, and make the _natural liberty_ of man an article
of publick commerce! and by what arguments can they possibly
defend that commerce, which cannot be carried on, in any single
instance, without a flagrant violation of the laws of nature and of God?

* * * * *

CHAP. V.

That we may the more accurately examine the arguments that are advanced
on this occasion, it will be proper to divide the _commerce_ into
two parts; first, as it relates to those who _sell_, and secondly,
as it relates to those who _purchase_, the _human species_
into slavery. To the former part of which, having given every previous
and necessary information in the history of servitude, we shall
immediately proceed.

Let us inquire first, by what particular right the _liberties_ of
the harmless people are invaded by the _prince_. "By the _right
of empire_," it will be answered; "because he possesses dominion and
power by their own approbation and consent." But subjects, though under
the dominion, are not the _property_, of the prince. They cannot be
considered as his _possessions_. Their _natures_ are both the
same; they are both born in the same manner; are subject to the same
disorders; must apply to the same remedies for a cure; are equally
partakers of the grave: an _incidental_ distinction accompanies
them through life, and this--is all.

We may add to this, that though the prince possesses dominion and power,
by the consent and approbation of his subjects, he possesses it only for
the most _salutary_ ends. He may tyrannize, if he can: he may alter
the _form_ of his government: he cannot, however, alter its
_nature_ and _end_. These will be immutably the same, though
the whole system of its administration should be changed; and he will be
still bound to _defend_ the lives and properties of his subjects,
and to make them _happy_.

Does he defend those therefore, whom he invades at discretion with the
sword? Does he protect the property of those, whose houses and effects
he consigns at discretion to the flames? Does he make those happy, whom
he seizes, as they are trying to escape the general devastation, and