s, if he, who is called a _master_, can have a
_just_ right to command the actions of him, who is called a
_slave_, it is evident that the latter cannot be accountable for
those crimes, which the former may order him to commit. Now as every
reasonable being is accountable for his actions, it is evident, that
such a right cannot _justly_ exist, and that human liberty, of
course, is beyond the possibility either of _sale_ or _purchase_.
Add to this, that, whenever you sell the liberty of a man,
you have the power only of alluding to the _body_: the _mind_
cannot be confined or bound: it will be free, though its
mansion be beset with chains. But if, in every sale of the _human
species_, you are under the necessity of considering your slave in
this abstracted light; of alluding only to the body, and of making no
allusion to the mind; you are under the necessity also of treating him,
in the same moment, as a _brute_, and of abusing therefore that
nature, which cannot otherwise be considered, than in the double
capacity of _soul_ and _body_.

But some person, perhaps, will make an objection to one of the former
arguments. "If men, from _superiority_ of their nature, cannot be
considered, like lands, goods, or houses, among possessions, so neither
can cattle: for being endued with life, motion, and sensibility, they
are evidently _superiour_ to these." But this objection will
receive its answer from those observations which have been already made;
and will discover the true reason, why cattle are justly to be estimated
as property. For first, the right to empire over brutes, is
_natural_, and not _adventitious_, like the right to empire
over men. There are, secondly, many and evident signs of the
_inferiority_ of their nature; and thirdly, their liberty can be
bought and sold, because, being void of reason, they cannot be
_accountable_ for their actions.

We might stop here for a considerable time, and deduce many valuable
lessons from the remarks that have been made, but that such a
circumstance might be considered as a digression. There is one, however,
which, as it is so intimately connected with the subject, we cannot but
deduce. We are taught to treat men in a different manner from brutes,
because they are so manifestly superiour in their nature; we are taught
to treat brutes in a different manner from stones, for the same reason;
and thus, by giving to every created thing its due respect, to answer
the views of Provid