t
subsisted among the ancients. But as this principle was the same among
all nations, and as a citation from many of their histories would not be
less tedious than unnecessary, we shall select the example of the Romans
for the consideration of the case.

The law, by which prisoners of war were said to be sentenced to
servitude, was the _law of nations_[043]. It was so called from the
universal concurrence of nations in the custom. It had two points in
view, the _persons_ of the _captured_, and their _effects_; both
of which it immediately sentenced, without any of the usual
forms of law, to be the property of the _captors_.

The principle, on which the law was established, was the _right of
capture_. When any of the contending parties had overcome their
opponents, and were about to destroy them, the right was considered to
commence; a right, which the victors conceived themselves to have, to
recall their swords, and, from the consideration of having saved the
lives of the vanquished, when they could have taken them by the laws of
war, to commute _blood_ for _service_. Hence the Roman lawyer,
Pomponius, deduces the etymology of _slave_ in the Roman language.
"They were called _servi_[044], says he, from the following
circumstance. It was usual with our commanders to take them prisoners,
and sell them: now this circumstance implies, that they must have been
previously _preserved_, and hence the name." Such then was the
_right of capture_. It was a right, which the circumstance of
_taking_ the vanquished, that is, of _preserving_ them alive,
gave the conquerors to their persons. By this right, as always including
the idea of a previous preservation from death, the vanquished were said
_to be slaves_[045]; and, "as all slaves," says Justinian, "are
themselves in the power of others, and of course can have nothing of
their own, so their effects followed the condition of their persons, and
became the property of the captors."

To examine this right, by which the vanquished were said to be slaves,
we shall use the words of a celebrated Roman author, and apply them to
the present case[046]. "If it is lawful," says he, "to deprive a man of
his life, it is certainly not inconsistent with nature to rob him;" to
rob him of his liberty. We admit the conclusion to be just, if the
supposition be the same: we allow, if men have a right to commit that,
which is considered as a greater crime, that they have a right, at the
same insta