ng defensive position. The creeks
are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens
out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an
enemy. On the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was
strongly intrenched.

Corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and
consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. We ought to
have seized it immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville,
when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it
should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at
Pittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh. In fact the arrival of
Pope should not have been awaited. There was no time from the battle of
Shiloh up to the evacuation of Corinth when the enemy would not have
left if pushed. The demoralization among the Confederates from their
defeats at Henry and Donelson; their long marches from Bowling Green,
Columbus, and Nashville, and their failure at Shiloh; in fact from
having been driven out of Kentucky and Tennessee, was so great that a
stand for the time would have been impossible. Beauregard made
strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. He
appealed to the people of the South-west for new regiments, and received
a few. A. S. Johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same
quarter, before the battle of Shiloh, but in a different way. He had
negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks
and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the
ranks. The people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were
not willing to part with their negroes. It is only fair to state that
they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for
the families left at home.

Beauregard, however, was reinforced by Van Dorn immediately after Shiloh
with 17,000 men. Interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to
add to the strength at Corinth. With these reinforcements and the new
regiments, Beauregard had, during the month of May, 1862, a large force
on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men. We estimated
his strength at 70,000. Our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. The
defensible nature of the ground at Corinth, and the fortifications, made
50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number
for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken