the
threatened movement without a battle. Our cavalry followed the enemy
south of Davis' mills in Mississippi.

On the 30th I found that Van Dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike
the Mississippi River above Memphis. At the same time other points
within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to
concentrate a force to drive him away. There was at this juncture a
large Union force at Helena, Arkansas, which, had it been within my
command, I could have ordered across the river to attack and break up
the Mississippi Central railroad far to the south. This would not only
have called Van Dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a
large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids
on the enemy's line of supplies. Geographical lines between the
commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were
too rigidly adhered to.

Van Dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above Memphis, as had
apparently been his intention. He was simply covering a deeper design;
one much more important to his cause. By the 1st of October it was
fully apparent that Corinth was to be attacked with great force and
determination, and that Van Dorn, Lovell, Price, Villepigue and Rust had
joined their strength for this purpose. There was some skirmishing
outside of Corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. The rebels
massed in the north-west angle of the Memphis and Charleston and the
Mobile and Ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at Corinth
and all possible reinforcements. Any fresh troops for us must come by a
circuitous route.

On the night of the 3d, accordingly, I ordered General McPherson, who
was at Jackson, to join Rosecrans at Corinth with reinforcements picked
up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. Hurlbut had been
ordered from Bolivar to march for the same destination; and as Van Dorn
was coming upon Corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with
the advance of Hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of
the 3d. On the 4th Van Dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to
capture Rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. In that case
the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of Corinth and held
at bay all the Union troops that arrived. In fact he could have taken
the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their
number and still left a sufficient garrison in t