ow process of gradual infiltration might be replaced by a more
expeditious mode of annexation. As the dexterous diplomacy of Ignatief
in 1858 had induced the Son of Heaven to cede to Russia the rich
Primorsk provinces between the Amur and the sea, as compensation for
Russian protection against the English and French, who had burnt his
Summer Palace, so his successor might now perhaps be induced to cede
Manchuria to the Tsar for similar reasons.

No such cession actually took place, but the Russian diplomatists in
Peking could use the gratitude argument in support of their demands for
an extension of the rights and privileges of the "temporary" occupation;
and when China sought to resist the pressure by leaning on the rival
Powers she found them to be little better than broken reeds. France
could not openly oppose her ally, and Germany had reasons of her own
for conciliating the Tsar, whilst England and the United States, though
avowedly opposing the scheme as dangerous to their commercial interests,
were not prepared to go to war in defence of their policy. It seemed,
therefore, that by patience, tenacity and diplomatic dexterity Russia
might ultimately attain her ends; but a surprise was in store for her.
There was one Power which recognised that her own vital interests were
at stake, and which was ready to undertake a life-and-death struggle in
defence of them.

Though still smarting under the humiliation of her expulsion from the
Liaotung Peninsula in 1895, and watching with the keenest interest every
move in the political game, Japan had remained for some time in the
background, and had confined her efforts to resisting Russian influence
in Korea and supporting diplomatically the Powers who were upholding
the policy of the open door. Now, when it had become evident that the
Western Powers would not prevent the realisation of the Russian scheme,
she determined to intervene energetically, and to stake her national
existence on the result. Ever since 1895 she had been making military
and naval preparations for the day of the revanche, and now that day was
at hand. Against the danger of a coalition such as had checkmated her
on the previous occasion she was protected by the alliance which she had
concluded with England in 1902, and she felt confident that with Russia
alone she was quite capable of dealing single-handed. Her position is
briefly and graphically described in a despatch, telegraphed at that
time (28th July