matters of exceptional importance, such as the election of a Tsar when
the throne became vacant, a declaration of war, the conclusion of a
peace, or the preparation of a new code of laws. Some fifteen assemblies
of the kind were convoked in the space of about a century (1550-1653).
They were composed largely of officials named by the Government, but
they contained also some representatives of the unofficial classes.
Their procedure was peculiar. When a speech from the throne had been
read by the Tsar or his representative, explaining the question to
be decided, the assembly transformed itself into a large number of
commissions, and each commission had to give in writing its opinion
regarding the questions submitted to it. The opinions thus elicited were
codified by the officials and submitted to the Tsar, and he was free to
adopt or reject them, as he thought fit. We may say, therefore, that the
Zemski Sobor was merely consultative and had no legislative power; but
we must add that it was allowed a certain initiative, because it was
permitted to submit to the Tsar humble petitions regarding anything
which it considered worthy of attention.

Alexander II. might have adopted this Slavophil idea and used the Zemski
Sobor as a means of transition from pure autocracy to a more modern
system of government, but he had no sooner created the Zemstvo than he
thought it necessary, as we have seen, to clip its wings, and dispel its
political ambition. By this repressive policy the frondeur spirit of the
Noblesse was revived, and it has continued to exist down to the present
time. On each occasion when I revisited Russia and had an opportunity
of feeling the pulse of public opinion, between 1876 and 1903, I noticed
that the dissatisfaction with the traditional methods of government, and
the desire of the educated classes to obtain a share of the political
power, notwithstanding short periods of apparent apathy, were steadily
spreading in area and increasing in intensity, and I often heard
predictions that a disastrous foreign war like the Crimean campaign
would probably bring about the desired changes. Of those who made such
predictions not a few showed clearly that, though patriotic enough in a
certain sense, they would not regret any military disaster which would
have the effect they anticipated. Progress in the direction of political
emancipation, accompanied by radical improvements in the administration,
was evidently regarded