concessions could be made on that point. In the work of establishing
law and order in Manchuria, constructing roads, bridges, railways, and
towns, Russia had expended an enormous sum--estimated by Count Cassini
at 60,000,000 pounds--and until that capital was recovered, or until a
reasonable interest was derived from the investment, Russia could not
think of sharing with any one the fruits of the prosperity which she had
created.

We need not go further into the details of the negotiations. Japan soon
convinced herself that the onward march of the Colossus was not to be
stopped by paper barricades, and knowing well that her actual military
and naval superiority was being rapidly diminished by Russia's warlike
preparations,* she suddenly broke off diplomatic relations and commenced
hostilities.

* According to an estimate made by the Japanese authorities,
between April, 1903, and the outbreak of the war, Russia
increased her naval and military forces in the Far East by
nineteen war vessels, aggregating 82,415 tons, and 40,000
soldiers. In addition to this, one battleship, three
cruisers, seven torpedo destroyers, and four torpedo boats,
aggregating about 37,040 tons, were on their way to the
East, and preparations had been made for increasing the land
forces by 200,000 men. For further details, see Asakawa,
"The Russo-Japanese Conflict" (London, 1904), pp. 352-54.

Russia thus found herself engaged in a war of the first magnitude, of
which no one can predict the ultimate consequences, and the question
naturally arises as to why, with an Emperor who lately aspired to play
in politics the part of a great peacemaker, she provoked a conflict,
for which she was very imperfectly prepared--imposing on herself the
obligation of defending a naval fortress, hastily constructed on foreign
territory, and united with her base by a single line of railway 6,000
miles long. The question is easily answered: she did not believe in the
possibility of war. The Emperor was firmly resolved that he would not
attack Japan, and no one would admit for a moment that Japan could have
the audacity to attack the great Russian Empire. In the late autumn
of 1903, it is true, a few well-informed officials in St. Petersburg,
influenced by the warnings of Baron Rosen, the Russian Minister in
Tokio, began to perceive that perhaps Japan would provoke a conflict,
but they were convinced that the milita