by an effete,
unwarlike population, wholly incapable of resisting a European Power.
That was quite enough to inflame the imagination of patriotic Russians;
but there was something more, dimly perceived in the background. Once
in possession of Manchuria, supplied with a network of railways, Russia
would dominate Peking and the whole of Northern China, and she would
thus be able to play a decisive part in the approaching struggle of the
European Powers for the Far-Eastern Sick Man's inheritance.

Of course there were obstacles in the way of realising this grandiose
scheme, and there were some cool heads in St. Petersburg who were not
slow to point them out. In the first place the undertaking must be
extremely costly, and the economic condition of Russia proper was not
such as to justify the expenditure of an enormous capital which must be
for many years unproductive. Any superfluous capital which the country
might possess was much more urgently required for purposes of internal
development, and the impoverished agricultural population ought not
to be drained of their last meagre reserves for the sake of gigantic
political schemes which did not directly contribute to their material
welfare. To this the enthusiastic advocates of the forward policy
replied that the national finances had never been in such a prosperous
condition, that the revenue was increasing by leaps and bounds, that
the money invested in the proposed enterprise would soon be repaid with
interest; and that if Russia did not at once seize the opportunity she
would find herself forestalled by energetic rivals. There was still,
however, one formidable objection. Such an enormous increase of
Russia's power in the Far East would inevitably arouse the jealousy and
opposition of other Powers, especially of Japan, for whom the future of
Korea and Manchuria was a question of life and death. Here again these
advocates of the forward policy had their answer ready. They declared
that the danger was more apparent than real. In Far-Eastern diplomacy
the European Powers could not compete with Russia, and they might easily
be bought off by giving them a very modest share of the spoil; as for
Japan, she was not formidable, for she was just emerging from Oriental
barbarism, and all her boasted progress was nothing more than a thin
veneer of European civilisation. As the Moscow patriots on the eve of
the Crimean War said contemptuously of the Allies, "We have only to
throw o