ects, real and supposed, of the present system are commonly
attributed to the predominance of the peasant element in the juries; and
this opinion, founded on a priori reasoning, seems to many too evident
to require verification. The peasantry are in many respects the most
ignorant class, and therefore, it is assumed, they are least capable of
weighing conflicting evidence. Plain and conclusive as this reasoning
seems, it is in my opinion erroneous. The peasants have, indeed,
little education, but they have a large fund of plain common-sense; and
experience proves--so at least I have been informed by many judges and
Public Prosecutors--that, as a general rule, a peasant jury is more to
be relied on than a jury drawn from the educated classes. It must be
admitted, however, that a peasant jury has certain peculiarities, and it
is not a little interesting to observe what those peculiarities are.

In the first place, a jury composed of peasants generally acts in a
somewhat patriarchal fashion, and does not always confine its attention
to the evidence and the arguments adduced at the trial. The members form
their judgment as men do in the affairs of ordinary life, and are sure
to be greatly influenced by any jurors who happen to be personally
acquainted with the prisoner. If several of the jurors know him to be a
bad character, he has little chance of being acquitted, even though
the chain of evidence against him should not be quite perfect. Peasants
cannot understand why a notorious scoundrel should be allowed to escape
because a little link in the evidence is wanting, or because some little
judicial formality has not been duly observed. Indeed, their ideas of
criminal procedure in general are extremely primitive. The Communal
method of dealing with malefactors is best in accordance with their
conceptions of well-regulated society. The Mir may, by a Communal decree
and without a formal trial, have any of its unruly members transported
to Siberia! This summary, informal mode of procedure seems to the
peasants very satisfactory. They are at a loss to understand how a
notorious culprit is allowed to "buy" an advocate to defend him, and are
very insensible to the bought advocate's eloquence. To many of them,
if I may trust to conversations which I have casually overheard in and
around the courts, "buying an advocate" seems to be very much the same
kind of operation as bribing a judge.

In the second place, the peasants, when act