ringing about a revolution: the former were not
numerous enough, and the latter were devoted to the Tsar and did not
sympathise with the revolutionary movement, though they might perhaps
be induced to rise at a moment of crisis. It was considered doubtful
whether such a rising was desirable, because the masses, being
insufficiently prepared, might turn against the educated minority. In no
case could a popular insurrection attain the object which the Socialists
had in view, because the power would either remain in the hands of the
Tsar--thanks to the devotion of the common people--or it would fall into
the hands of the Liberals, who would oppress the masses worse than the
autocratic Government had done. Further, it was recognised that acts of
terrorism were worse than useless, because they were misunderstood by
the ignorant, and tended to inflame the masses against the leaders.
It seemed necessary, therefore, to return to a pacific propaganda.
Tikhomirof, who was nominally directing the movement from abroad, became
utterly discouraged, and wrote in 1884 to one of his emissaries in
Russia (Lopatin): "You now see Russia, and can convince yourself that it
does not possess the material for a vast work of reorganisation. . . .
I advise you seriously not to make superhuman efforts and not to make
a scandal in attempting the impossible. . . . If you do not want to
satisfy yourself with trifles, come away and await better times."

In examining the material relating to this period one sees clearly that
the revolutionary movement had got into a vicious circle. As pacific
propaganda had become impossible, in consequence of the opposition of
the authorities and the vigilance of the police, the Government could be
overturned only by a general insurrection; but the general insurrection
could not be prepared without pacific propaganda. As for terrorism, it
had become discredited. Tikhomirof himself came to the conclusion that
the terrorist idea was altogether a mistake, not only morally, but also
from the point of view of political expediency. A party, he explained,
has either the force to overthrow the Government, or it has not; in the
former case it has no need of political assassination, and in the latter
the assassinations have no effect, because Governments are not so stupid
as to let themselves be frightened by those who cannot overthrow them.
Plainly there was nothing to be done but to wait for better times, as he
had suggested,