ociferous in this country whence it was hoped the enormous new
fleets of aircraft would come, it was fomented and earnestly pressed
by our Allies. France sent a deputation of her leading flyers over
to supervise the instruction of our new pilots. England contributed
experts to advise as to the construction of our machines. The most
comprehensive plans were urged upon Congress and the Administration
for the creation of a navy of the air. A bill for an initial
appropriation of $640,000,000, for aircraft purposes alone, was
passed and one for a Department of Aeronautics to be established,
co-ordinate with those of War and the Navy, its secretary holding a
seat in the cabinet, was introduced in Congress. Many of the most
eminent retired officers of the navy joined in their support.
Retired officers only because officers in active service were
estopped from political agitation.

There was every possible reason for this great interest in the
United States in wartime aviation. The nation had long been
shamefaced because the development of the heavier-than-air machines,
having their origin undoubtedly in the inventive genius of Professor
Langley and the Wrights, had been taken away from us by the more
alert governments of France and Germany. The people were ready to
buy back something of our lost prestige by building the greatest of
air fleets at the moment when it should exercise the most
determinative influence upon the war.

But more. We entered upon the war in our chronic state of
unpreparedness. We were without an army and without equipment for
one. To raise, equip, and drill an army of a million, the least
number that would have any appreciable effect upon the outcome of
the war, would take months. When completed we would have added only
to the numerical superiority of the Allies on the Western Front. The
quality of a novel and decisive contribution to the war would be
lacking.

So too it was with our navy. The British Navy was amply adequate to
deal with the German fleet should the latter ever leave its prudent
retreat behind Helgoland and in the bases of Kiel and Wilhelmshaven.
True it was not capable of crushing out altogether the submarine
menace, but it did hold the German underwater boats down to a fixed
average of ships destroyed, which was far less than half of what the
Germans had anticipated. In this work our ships, especially our
destroyers, took a notable part.

The argument for a monster fleet of fighti