ovember 18, 1915.

"Early in 1916 an Austrian seaplane sank the French submarine
_Foucault_ in the southern Adriatic. Lieutenant Calezeny was the
pilot and the observer was Lieutenant von Klinburg. After
crippling the submarine they then performed the remarkable feat
of calling another Austrian seaplane and rescuing the entire
French crew, two officers and twenty seven men, in spite of the
fact that a high sea was running at the time."

It will be noted that Admiral Peary lays great stress on the supreme
value of aircraft as foes of the submarine. This was due to the fact
that at about the time of his appearance before the Senate Committee
the world was fairly panic-stricken by the vigour and effect of the
German submarine campaign and its possible bearing upon the outcome
of the war. Of that campaign I shall have more to say in the section
of this book dealing with submarines. But the subject of the
undersea boat in war became at this time inextricably interwoven
with that of the aerial fleets, and the sudden development of the
latter, together with the marked interest taken in it by our people,
cannot be understood without some description of the way in which
the two became related.

From the very beginning of the war the Germans had prosecuted a
desultory submarine warfare on the shipping of Great Britain and had
extended it gradually until neutral shipping also was largely
involved. All the established principles of international law, or
principles that had been supposed to be established, were set at
naught. In bygone days enemy merchant ships were subject to
destruction only after their crews had been given an opportunity to
take to the boats. Neutral ships bearing neutral goods, even if
bound to an enemy port, were liable to destruction only if found
upon visit to be carrying goods that were contraband of war. The
list of contraband had been from time immemorial rigidly limited,
and confined almost wholly to munitions of war, or to raw material
used in their construction. But international law went by the board
early in the war. Each belligerent was able to ascribe plausible
reasons for its amendment out of recognizable form. Great Britain
established blockades two hundred miles away from the blockaded
ports because the submarines made the old practice of watching at
the entrance of the port too perilous. The list of contraband of war
was extended by both belligerents until