order to be ready for the great
1918 offensive work must be begun at once."

The extreme secrecy which in this war has characterized the
operation of the governments--our own most of all--makes it
impossible to state the amount of progress made in 1917 in the
construction of our aerial fleet. During the debate in Congress
orators were very outspoken in their prophecies that we should
outnumber the Kaiser's flying fleet two or three to one. The press
of the nation was so very explicit in its descriptions of the way in
which we were to blind the Germans and drive them from the air that
it is no wonder the Kaiser's government took alarm, and set about
building additional aircraft with feverish zeal. In this it was
imitated by France and England. It seemed, all at once about the
middle of 1917, that the whole belligerent world suddenly recognized
the air as the final battlefield and began preparations for its
conquest.

All statistical estimates in war time are subject to doubt as to
their accuracy--and particularly those having to do in any way with
the activities of an enemy country. But competent estimators--or at
any rate shrewd guessers--think that Germany's facilities for
constructing airplanes equal those of France and England together.
If then all three nations build to the very limit of their abilities
there will be a tie, which the contribution of aircraft from the
United States will settle overwhelmingly in favour of the Allies.
How great that contribution may be cannot be foretold with certainty
at this moment. The building of aircraft was a decidedly infant
industry in this country when war began. In the eight years prior to
1916 the government had given orders for just fifty-nine
aircraft--scarcely enough to justify manufacturers in keeping their
shops open. Orders from foreign governments, however, stimulated
production after the war began so that when the United States
belatedly took her place as national honour and national safety
demanded among the Entente Allies, Mr. Howard E. Coffin, Chairman of
the Aircraft Section of the Council of National Defence was able to
report eight companies capable of turning out about 14,000 machines
in six months--a better showing than British manufacturers could
have made when Great Britain, first entered the war.

A feature in the situation which impressed both Congress and the
American people was the exposure by various military experts of the
defenceless condit