course, included,
if they will accept equality and not seek domination."

About five weeks prior to the Pope's proposition, the Germans had again
put forth a peace feeler. On July 19, the German reichstag adopted
resolutions in favor of peace on the basis of mutual understanding and
lasting reconciliation among the nations. The resolutions sounded well
but they were accompanied by expressions to the effect that Germany in
the war was the victim of aggression and that it approved the acts of
its government. They referred to the "men who are defending the
Fatherland," to the necessity of assuring the freedom of the seas, and
to the impossibility of conquering a united German nation. There was no
doubt in the mind of any neutral or any belligerent opposing Germany
that the German government was the real aggressor and that the freedom
of the seas had never been restricted except by Germany herself, hence
there was no tendency to accept this as a serious bid for peace. The
resolutions figured largely in German internal politics but were without
effect elsewhere.

Stockholm, Sweden was the scene of a number of peace conferences but as
they were engineered by socialists of an extreme type and others holding
views usually classed as anarchistic, no serious attention was paid to
them. The "pacifists" in the Allied and neutral countries were more or
less active, but received little encouragement. Their arguments did not
appeal to patriotism.

Going back to the beginning of the year, within a week after the
President's "peace without victory" speech before the senate, Germany
replied to it by announcing that beginning February 1, it would begin
unrestricted submarine warfare in certain extensive zones around the
British Isles, France and Italy. It would, however, out of the kindness
of its heart, permit the United States to use a narrow track across the
sea with a landing at Falmouth, one ship a week, provided the American
ships were painted red and white and carried various kinds of
distinguishing marks.

This of course was a direct repudiation by Germany of all the promises
she had made to the United States. The President saw the sword being
forced into his hands but he was not yet ready to seize it with all his
might. He preferred first to exhaust the expediency of an armed
neutrality. On February 3, he went before a joint session of the house
and senate and announced that Ambassador von Bernstorff had been given
his