without reference to the other side and by an omission here
and there, possibly unintentionally, the sense was altered. Thus Mr.
Bullitt, by repeating only a part of my words and by omitting the
context, entirely changed the meaning of what was said. My attitude was,
and I intended to show it at the time, that the Treaty should be signed
and ratified at the earliest possible moment because the restoration of
peace was paramount and that any provision in the Treaty which might
delay the peace, by making uncertain senatorial consent to ratification,
was to be deplored.

Having submitted to the President the question of making a public
explanation of my interview with Mr. Bullitt which would in a measure at
least correct the impression caused by his statement, I could not do so
until I received the President's approval. That was never received. The
telegram, which was sent to Mr. Wilson, through the Department of State,
was never answered. It was not even acknowledged. The consequence was
that the version of the conversation given by Mr. Bullitt was the only
one that up to the present time has been published.

The almost unavoidable conclusion from the President's silence is that
he considered my explanation was insufficient to destroy or even to
weaken materially the effect of Mr. Bullitt's account of what had taken
place, and that the public would believe in spite of it that I was
opposed to the Treaty and hostile to the League of Nations. I am not
disposed to blame the President for holding this opinion considering
what had taken place at Paris. From his point of view a statement, such
as I was willing to make, would in no way help the situation. I would
still be on record as opposed to certain provisions of the Treaty,
provisions which he was so earnestly defending in his addresses. While
Mr. Bullitt had given an incomplete report of our conversation, there
was sufficient truth in it to make anything but a flat denial seem of
little value to the President; and, as I could not make such a denial,
his point of view seemed to be that the damage was done and could not be
undone. I am inclined to think that he was right.

My views concerning the Treaty at the time of the conversation with Mr.
Bullitt are expressed in a memorandum of May 8, 1919, which is
as follows:

"The terms of peace were yesterday delivered to the German
plenipotentiaries, and for the first time in these days of feverish
rush of preparatio