d to appreciate, or, if he did appreciate, to have
ignored the fact that the conditions were wholly different in October,
1918, from what they were in December, 1916.
In December, 1916, the United States was a neutral nation, and the
President, in a spirit of mutual friendliness, which was real and not
assumed, was seeking to bring the warring powers together in conference
looking toward the negotiation of "a peace without victory." In the
event that he was able to persuade them to meet, his presence at the
conference as a pacificator and probably as the presiding officer would
not improbably have been in the interests of peace, because, as the
executive head of the greatest of the neutral nations of the world and
as the impartial friend of both parties, his personal influence would
presumably have been very great in preventing a rupture in the
negotiations and in inducing the parties to act in a spirit of
conciliation and compromise.
In October, 1918, however, the United States was a belligerent. Its
national interests were involved; its armies were in conflict with the
Germans on the soil of France; its naval vessels were patrolling the
Atlantic; and the American people, bitterly hostile, were demanding
vengeance on the Governments and peoples of the Central Powers,
particularly those of Germany. President Wilson, it is true, had
endeavored with a measure of success to maintain the position of an
unbiased arbiter in the discussions leading up to the armistice of
November 11, and Germany undoubtedly looked to him as the one hope of
checking the spirit of revenge which animated the Allied Powers in view
of all that they had suffered at the hands of the Germans. It is
probable too that the Allies recognized that Mr. Wilson was entitled to
be satisfied as to the terms of peace since American man power and
American resources had turned the scale against Germany and made victory
a certainty. The President, in fact, dominated the situation. If he
remained in Washington and carried on the negotiations through his
Commissioners, he would in all probability retain his superior place and
be able to dictate such terms of peace as he considered just. But, if he
did as he purposed doing and attended the Peace Conference, he would
lose the unique position which he held and would have to submit to the
combined will of his foreign colleagues becoming a prey to intrigue and
to the impulses arising from their hatred for the vanquishe
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