ears to me that a positive guaranty of territorial integrity
and political independence by the nations would have to rest upon an
open recognition of dominant coercive power in the articles of
agreement, the power being commercial and economic as well as
physical. The wisdom of entering into such a guaranty is questionable
and should be carefully considered before being adopted.

"In order to avoid the recognition of force as a basis and the
question of dominant force with the unavoidable classification of
nations into 'big' and 'little,' 'strong' and 'weak,' the desired
result of a guaranty might be attained by entering into a mutual
undertaking _not_ to impair the territorial integrity or to violate
the political sovereignty of any state. The breach of this
undertaking would be a breach of the treaty and would sever the
relations of the offending nation with all other signatories."

I have given these two extracts from my notes in order to show the views
that I held, at the time the American Commission was about to depart
from the United States, in regard to the character of the guaranty which
the President intended to make the central feature of the League of
Nations. In the carrying out of his scheme and in creating an
organization to give effect to the guaranty I believed that I saw as an
unavoidable consequence an exaltation of force and an overlordship of
the strong nations. Under such conditions it would be impossible to
preserve within the organization the equality of nations, a precept of
international law which was the universally recognized basis of
intercourse between nations in time of peace. This I considered most
unwise and a return to the old order, from which every one hoped that
the victory over the Central Empires had freed the world.

The views expressed in the notes quoted formed the basis for my
subsequent course of action as an American Commissioner at Paris in
relation to the League of Nations. Convinced from previous experience
that to oppose every form of guaranty by the nations assembled at Paris
would be futile in view of the President's apparent determination to
compel the adoption of that principle, I endeavored to find a form of
guaranty that would be less objectionable than the one which the
President had in mind. The commitment of the United States to any
guaranty seemed to me at least questionable, though to prevent it seemed
impossible in the c