sts and by political considerations rather than by a
desire and purpose to do impartial justice by applying legal principles.

It is true that in Article V of the first draft of the Covenant
(Appendix) there is an agreement to submit to arbitration
certain classes of controversies and a method of selecting arbitrators
is provided--a method, by the way, which the actual experience of a
century has shown to be the least satisfactory in administering legal
justice, since it almost inevitably leads to a compromise which impairs
the just rights of one of the parties. But, to my mind, a provision, far
more objectionable than the antiquated and unsatisfactory method of
arbitration provided, was that which made an arbitral award reviewable
on appeal to the Body of Delegates of the League, which could set aside
the award even if the arbitrators had rendered a unanimous decision and
compel a rehearing before other arbitrators. International arbitration
as a method of applying the principles of justice to disputes between
nations would, in the first instance at least, have become a farce if
this provision had been adopted. As an award based on compromise is
seldom, if ever, satisfactory to both parties, the right of appeal would
in substantially every case have been invoked and the award would have
been reviewed by the Body of Delegates, who would practically render a
final decision since the new arbitrators would presumably adopt it. The
effect of this provision as to appeals was, therefore, to supplant
judicial settlements by political compromises and diplomatic
adjustments, in which the national interests of the judges, many of whom
would be untrained in juridical procedure, would be decided, if not
deciding, factors. Manifestly the expediency of the moment would be far
more potent in the decisions reached than the principles and precepts of
international law.

I shall not express here my opinion as to the reasons which I believe
impelled the President to insert in the Covenant these extraordinary
provisions which deprived arbitral courts of that independence of the
executive authority which has been in modern times considered essential
to the impartial administration of justice. But, when one considers how
jealously and effectively the Constitution of the United States and the
constitutions of the various States of the Union guard the judiciary
from executive and legislative interference, the proposal in the
President's plan