ade,'" (by which he means the slave
trade, of which he is writing,) 'is highly beneficial and advantageous
to the kingdom and the colonies.' To prove this he refers to statute of
"1795, 8 and 10 Wm. 3, ch. 26." (Should be 1797, 8-9 and 10 Wm. 3, ch.
26.)

Now the truth is that, although this statute may have been, and very
probably was designed to _insinuate_ to the slave traders the personal
approbation of parliament to the slave trade, yet the statute itself
says not a word of slaves, slavery, or the slave trade, except to
forbid, under penalty of five hundred pounds, any governor,
deputy-governor or judge, in the colonies or plantations in America, or
any other person or persons, for the use or on the behalf of such
governor, deputy-governor or judges, to be "a factor or factor's agent
or agents" "for the sale or disposal of any negroes."

The statute does not declare, as Mr. Bancroft asserts, that "the (slave)
trade is highly beneficial and advantageous to the kingdom and the
colonies;" but that "_the trade to Africa_ is highly beneficial and
advantageous," &c. It is an _inference_ of Mr. Bancroft's that "the
trade to Africa" was the _slave_ trade. Even this inference is not
justified by the words of the statute, considering them in that legal
view, in which Mr. Bancroft's remarks purport to consider them.

It is true that the statute assumes that "_negroes_" will be "imported"
from Africa into "England," (where of course they were not slaves,) and
into the "plantations and colonies in America." But it nowhere calls
these "negroes" _slaves_, nor assumes that they are slaves. For aught
that appears from the statute, they were free men and passengers,
voluntary emigrants, going to "England" and "the plantations and
colonies" as laborers, as such persons are now going to the British West
Indies.

The statute, although it apparently desires to insinuate or faintly
imply that they are property, or slaves, nevertheless studiously avoids
to acknowledge them as such distinctly, or even by any necessary
implication; for it exempts them from duties as merchandize, and from
forfeiture for violation of revenue laws, and it also relieves the
masters of vessels from any obligation to render any account of them at
the custom houses.

When it is considered that slavery, property in man, can be legalized,
according to the decision of Lord Mansfield, by nothing less than
positive law; that the rights of property and person are