f all these imaginings is apparent, the moment it is
considered that the constitution is not a _person_, of whom an
"intention," not legally expressed, can be asserted; that it has none of
the various and selfish passions and motives of action, which sometimes
prompt _men_ to the practice of duplicity and disguise; that it is
merely a written legal instrument; that, as such, it must have a fixed,
and not a double meaning; that it is made up entirely of intelligible
words; and that it has, and _can_ have, no soul, no "_intentions_," no
motives, no being, no personality, except what those words alone express
or imply. Its "intentions" are nothing more nor less than the legal
meaning of its words. Its intentions are no guide to its legal
meaning--as the advocates of slavery all assume; but its legal meaning
is the sole guide to its intentions. This distinction is all important
to be observed; for if we can gratuitously assume the intentions of a
legal instrument to be what we may wish them to be, and can then strain
or pervert the ordinary meaning of its words, in order to make them
utter those intentions, we can make any thing we choose of any legal
instrument whatever. The legal meaning of the words of an instrument is,
therefore, necessarily our only guide to its intentions.

In ascertaining the legal meaning of the words of the constitution,
these rules of law, (the reasons of which will be more fully explained
hereafter,) are vital to be borne constantly in mind, viz: 1st, that no
intention in violation of natural justice and natural right, (like that
to sanction slavery,) can be ascribed to the constitution, unless that
intention be expressed in terms that are _legally competent_ to express
such an intention; and, 2d, that no terms, except those that are
plenary, express, explicit, distinct, unequivocal, _and to which no
other meaning can be given, are legally competent_ to authorize or
sanction any thing contrary to natural right. The rule of law is
materially different as to the terms necessary to legalize and sanction
any thing contrary to natural right, and those necessary to legalize
things that are consistent with natural right. The latter may be
sanctioned by implication and inference; the former only by inevitable
implication, or by language that is full, definite, express, explicit,
unequivocal, and whose _unavoidable_ import is to sanction the _specific
wrong_ intended.

To assert, therefore, that the cons